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Abstract 
 
 For 51 years, the physical presence rule has hampered states in collecting sales and use 
taxes from sellers with no property or personnel within state borders. The U.S. Supreme Court 
established this rule in 1967 in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of the State 
of Illinois, based on the formalistic Due Process Clause and dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence of that time, under which states had no authority to tax interstate commerce. 
However, in 1992, the Court upheld the physical presence rule under the dormant Commerce 
Clause in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, notwithstanding dramatic changes in dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the economy. On June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court 
rejected the physical presence rule in South Dakota v. Wayfair as anachronistic, unfair, and out 
of touch with the modern economy. This change will finally allow states to collect sales and use 
tax from remote sellers. 
 
Keywords: state tax, sales tax, use tax, physical presence, remote seller, remote sale, Internet 
sale, interstate commerce, dormant Commerce Clause, due process, Bellas Hess, Quill, Wayfair. 
 
Introduction 
 
 States have long had their hands tied in collecting sales and use taxes1 from out-of-state 
sellers that use the Internet and mail order to reach customers inside of their state. For over 50 
years, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence2 has required that an 
out-of-state seller have a “physical presence” through tangible or real property or personnel 
within the borders of the state for the state to have the authority to impose sales taxes or the 
requirement to collect use taxes on the seller.3 While the physical presence rule may not have 
                                                             
1 Sales taxes and use taxes are a complementary system states employ to collect as a tax a percentage of sales made 
to customers in-state. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., No. 17-494 (June 21, 2018) (slip opinion) at 7. Sellers are 
required to collect the sales tax at the time of sale from the customer and remit it to the state. Id. If the seller does not 
collect the sales tax, the customer is required to pay use tax, an amount equal to the sales tax, directly to the state. Id. 
However, consumer compliance with use tax requirements is “notoriously low.” Id., citing GAO, “Report to 
Congressional Requesters: Sales Taxes, States Could Gain Revenue from Expanded Authority, but Businesses Are 
Likely to Experience Compliance Costs,” GAO-18-114, at 5 (Nov. 2017). 
2 The Commerce Clause grants Congress power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const. 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The dormant Commerce Clause, though not an express part of the Commerce Clause, is a judicially 
created doctrine that prevents states from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. 1, 199-205, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (first recognizing the power of states to regulate and tax subject 
to limitation of burdening interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause). The courts have interpreted the 
dormant Commerce Clause to mean that states cannot impose taxes or take any other action that will interfere or 
discriminate against commerce among the states. (Howsare 2017) 
3 The physical presence rule appears to have been limited to the collection of sales and use taxes. The Supreme 
Court has not applied the physical presence rule to other types of state taxes and has also not accepted certiorari in 
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had a major effect on sales and use tax revenues collected by states 50 years ago when the mail 
order industry was limited and the Internet did not exist, the increasing growth of commerce by 
remote sellers,4 particularly due to the explosive development of Internet sales, has exponentially 
increased the physical presence rule’s negative impact on state’s tax revenues. (Thimmesch 
2011/2012) 
That all changed on June 21, 2018 when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair.5 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected the physical presence rule and 
overturned the two cases responsible for its long life, National Bellas Hess v. Department of 
Revenue of the State of Illinois,6 and Quill Corporation v. North Dakota.7 In Wayfair, the 
Supreme Court recognized states’ sovereignty and authority to tax remote sellers doing 
substantial business with customers inside state borders and restored equity to the application of 
sales and use taxes on both in state and remote sellers. The Court’s rejection of the physical 
presence rule will allow states to dramatically increase collection of sales and use tax revenues 
from remote sellers within the reasonable boundaries of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
 At the time Bellas Hess was decided, the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was 
formalistic, such that the Court was virtually required to hold that an in-state physical presence 
was necessary to impose state sales and use taxes on a seller. When Quill was decided in 1992, 
the Court’s jurisprudence in this area had dramatically changed providing for a more functional 
and realistic analysis; nonetheless, the Quill Court upheld the physical presence rule under the 
doctrine of stare decisis8 and practical concerns about the application of state sales and use taxes 
to remote sellers. Now, not only is the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence flexible, 
the economy of the nation has dramatically changed. This compelled the Court to reject the 
physical presence rule and overturn Bellas Hess and Quill in Wayfair.  
There are repeating legal issues in all three decisions, sometimes relied upon in the 
majority opinion and sometimes by the dissenters. These include:  
 whether formalism or functionalism should govern dormant Commerce Clause analysis;  
 whether violations of the Due Process Clause and burdening interstate commerce are 
similar or could be distinguished;  
 whether the doctrine of stare decisis compels maintenance of the rule;  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
any state case addressing that issue. However, in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota, the Court appeared to limit the 
physical presence rule to sales and use taxes. 504 U.S. 298, 317, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1992). (Swain I 
2003) Other commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s lack of action in this area means that the physical 
presence rule should be applied to other state taxes. (Murtha 2013) However, the majority of state courts have held 
that the physical presence rule applies only to sales and use taxes and not to other types of state taxes. (Thimmesch 
2011/2012) Because of the Wayfair decision, however, that issue is now moot. 
3 U.S., No. 17-494 (June 21, 2018).  
4 This article uses the term “remote sellers” to mean out-of-state sellers with no physical presence in a state, as 
defined in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 
L.Ed. 2d 505 (1967), and its progeny. 
5 U.S., No. 17-494 (June 21, 2018). 
6 386 U.S. 753, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 18 L.Ed. 2d 505 (1967).  
7 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1992). 
8 Stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by decided matters.” (Meriam-Webster Law Dictionary 2018) The doctrine of 
stare decisis provides a strong motivation to courts to apply and abide by precedent and not disturb settled issues. 
While the doctrine does allow for change in certain situations, the courts consider (1) whether there has been a major 
change in related areas of the law; (2) whether there has been a factual change in the economy, the culture, 
technology, and other aspects of society; (3) whether the precedent is now unworkable; and (4) whether strong 
reliance interests exist that would be harmed by a change in the law. (Swain II 2003) 
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 whether the absence of the physical presence rule would unduly burden remote sellers 
with the administrative requirements of complying with state and local taxes;  
 whether the rule resulted in tax distortion, unfairly penalized in-state sellers, and 
constituted a judicially created tax shelter;  
 whether the changes in technology and the economy have made the rule obsolete; and  
 whether any or all of these issues should be left to Congress.  
The Court’s changing analysis of the physical presence rule was also impacted by other cases 
involving the dormant Commerce Clause’s effect on state taxation, especially Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady9 and National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization.10 
 This article examines the Court’s varying findings on the validity of the physical 
presence rule from 1967 to today and predicts how the Wayfair ruling will change the analysis on 
whether states’ taxation of remote sellers violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 
The Establishment of the “Physical Presence” Rule 
 
National Bellas Hess, Incorporated v. Department of Revenue of the State of Illinois 
 
 The physical presence rule originated in Bellas Hess.11 National Bellas Hess, Inc. 
(“Bellas Hess”) was a mail order house that sold millions of dollars in goods to Illinois 
residents.12 It was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Missouri.13 
Bellas Hess had no offices, distribution houses, sales houses, warehouses, or any other place of 
business in Illinois.14 It had no personnel in Illinois to sell or take orders or to service the 
merchandise it sold.15 It did not own any tangible property in Illinois and did not advertise in 
newspapers or on billboards, radio, or television in Illinois.16 The only contacts Bellas Hess had 
with Illinois were through U.S. mail and common carrier.17 It sent catalogues by mail to Illinois 
customers (as well as its other customers nationwide) twice a year and occasionally mailed 
advertising flyers.18 In order to purchase goods, customers mailed orders to Bellas Hess at its 
Missouri plant, and Bellas Hess would fill the orders, shipping the goods by mail or common 
carrier.19 
 The Illinois Department of Revenue sought to require Bellas Hess and similar remote 
sellers to collect use taxes from its customers and remit them to the state under Section 3 of the 
                                                             
9 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). 
10 430 U.S. 551, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977). 
11 The Bellas Hess Court did not use the words “physical presence” to describe the rule. These words were used in 
later cases. See, e.g., National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556 (stating that appellant’s two offices and employees in-
state constituted “a much more substantial presence than the expression ‘slightest presence’ connotes.”); Quill, 504 
U.S. at 314-315 (1992) (calling it the “physical-presence requirement” from Bellas Hess, which it described as a 
“bright-line test.”)  
12 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760-61 (J. Fortas, dissent) (“Its sales in Illinois amounted to $2,174,744 for the 
approximately 15 months for which the taxes in issue in this case were assessed.”) 
13 Id., 386 U.S. at 753-54. 
14 Id., 386 U.S. at 754, quoting Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 164, 166-67 (1966). 
15 Bellas Hess, quoting 34 Ill. 2d at 167. 
16 Id. 
17 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 754. 
18 Id. 
19 Id., 386 U.S. at 754-55. 
Keane 
 
20 
 
Use Tax Act in effect at that time in Illinois.20 Under that section, “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders 
within this State from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are 
received or accepted within or without this State,” was enough to classify the seller as a “retailer 
maintaining a place of business in this State.”21 In other words, under the statute, any retailer that 
solicited orders in Illinois, whether physically located in Illinois or not, was deemed to maintain 
a place of business in Illinois. These retailers, including Bellas Hess, were required to collect and 
remit use taxes from its Illinois customers, provide receipts to their customers, keep detailed 
records, and submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the Department of Revenue and Illinois 
courts, with the Illinois Secretary of State designated as their appointed agent for service of 
process.22 
 After Bellas Hess failed to collect and remit the use tax, the Department sued to resolve 
whether it was responsible for collecting and remitting the use tax. The trial court entered 
summary judgment in favor of the Department for $93,242.18, representing taxes of $74,593.75 
assessed under the Use Tax Act for the 15-month period, plus a 25% penalty of $18,648.43.23 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.24 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Bellas Hess argued that the application of the Illinois statute against it violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and created an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce under the dormant Commerce Clause.25 
 In the majority opinion, the Court found that the tests for violations of the Due Process 
Clause and unduly burdening interstate commerce were similar.26 The Court determined that a 
state tax imposed on interstate commerce would be justified only to the extent that the interstate 
business bears its share of the cost of the local government “whose protection it enjoys.”27 The 
Court described the test for determining whether a state tax violates due process as “whether the 
state has given anything for which it can ask return.”28 The Court determined that the same 
question in the due process test could be applied to the power of a state to impose burdens of 
collecting use tax on interstate sales.29 It found that in both tests, the Constitution required a 
minimum connection between the state and the transaction it seeks to tax.30 
 The Bellas Hess Court outlined the previous instances in which it had upheld a state’s 
right to impose a duty to collect a state use tax from an out-of-state seller: (1) when the out-of-
state seller had a local agent in the taxing state that arranged the sales31; (2) when a mail order 
seller maintained local retail stores32; and (3) when the out-of-state seller had 10 employees 
conducting continuous solicitation in one state who forwarded the orders from that state to 
                                                             
20 Id., 386 U.S. at 755, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. chap. 120, §439.2 (1965).  
21 Id., quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. chap. 120, §439.2 (1965). 
22 Id., 386 U.S. at 755-56. 
23 Department of Revenue, 34 Ill.2d 164, 214 N.E.2d 755, 756 (1966). 
24 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753. 
25 Id., 386 U.S. at 756. 
26 Id.  
27 Id., quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253, 67 S. Ct. 274, 277, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1946). 
28 Bellas Hess, quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444, 61 S.Ct. 246, 250, 85 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1940). 
29 Id., 386 U.S. at 756. 
30 Bellas Hess, citing Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45, 74 S.Ct. 535, 539, 98 L.Ed. 744 
(1954) and Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207-210,211, 80 S.Ct. 619, 621-622, 4 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1960). 
31 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757, citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 59 S.Ct. 376, 83 L.Ed. 
488 (1939); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 64 S.Ct. 1028, 88 L.Ed. 1309 (1944). 
32 Bellas Hess, citing Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 61 S.Ct. 58, 85 L.Ed. 888 (1941); Nelson v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, 61 S.Ct. 593, 85 L.Ed. 897 (1941). 
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another state for shipment.33 In all of these cases, the Court noted, the out-of-state sellers 
maintained personnel or tangible personal or real property in the taxing state. The Court 
determined that it had never held that a state could impose a requirement that an out-of-state 
seller collect use taxes if that seller’s only connection with customers in that state was by mail or 
common carrier.34  
Because Bellas Hess had no property or personnel of any kind in Illinois and its only 
connections with its customers in Illinois were by mail and common carrier, the Court held that 
Bellas Hess’s activities in Illinois were exclusively interstate and subject only to Congressional 
regulation and not state taxes.35  
The Court also opined that, if Illinois were allowed to impose use tax burdens on Bellas 
Hess, every other state, municipality, school district, and local taxing body could also do so.36 
Such “local entanglements” were not unjustified under the Commerce Clause.37 The Court held 
that the Illinois statute violated the Due Process Clause and placed an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. 
 Justice Fortas, joined by Justices Black and Douglas, dissented.38 He asserted that Court 
precedent39 and “a realistic approach”40 to the facts required the Court to affirm the Illinois 
Supreme Court.41 The dissent focused on the quantity of Bellas Hess’s sales in Illinois, the large 
number of Illinois residents who received catalogues twice a year, and even greater number of 
Illinois residents who received Bellas Hess’s flyers.42 Justice Fortas argued that Bellas Hess’s 
advertising and sales solicitations were large-scale, systematic, and continuous, and constituted 
exploitation of the Illinois consumer market.43 
 The dissent also argued that Bellas Hess offered credit to Illinois residents with which to 
finance their purchases and a charge account, both of which required the applicant to provide 
bank information.44 Justice Fortas opined that it would be reasonable to assume that Bellas Hess 
either sold, assigned, or otherwise collected on its delinquent accounts, which would require the 
company, its assignees, or representatives to conduct activities within the state.45 Bellas Hess’s 
solicitations and the use of residents’ credit resources, which were dependent on the State’s 
                                                             
33 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757-58, quoting Scripto. 
34 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 (“In order to uphold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens on National in 
this case, we would have to repudiate totally the sharp distinction which these and other decisions have drawn 
between mail order sellers with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within a State, and those who do no more than 
communicate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate business. But this 
basic distinction, which until now has been generally recognized by the state taxing authorities, is a valid one, and 
we decline to obliterate it.”). 
35 Id., 386 U.S. at 759 (“Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate in 
character than the mail order transactions here involved.”). 
36 Id., 386 U.S. at 759-60. 
37 Id., 386 U.S. at 760. 
38 Id., 386 U.S. at 761-766 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
39 Scripto, supra, n. 30. 
40 Here, Justice Fortas distinguished between the formalistic analysis conducted by the Bellas Hess majority and a 
realistic analysis that took into account the extent of Bellas Hess’s involvement in the state. 
41 Id., 386 U.S. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. 
43 Id., 386 U.S. at 761 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
44 Id., 386 U.S. at 761-62 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
45 Id., 386 U.S. at 762 (Fortas, J., dissenting) 
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banking and credit institutions, he argued, constituted a sufficient nexus46 with Illinois to require 
Bellas Hess to comply with Illinois’ use tax collection requirements.47  
 Finally, Justice Fortas argued that excusing companies like Bellas Hess from the use tax 
collection requirements of the state burdened and penalized in-state retailers required to collect 
sales tax from their customers,48 and that any burden on Bellas Hess from compliance with 
Illinois and local law was no greater than the burden on in-state retailers.49 Further, the dissent 
noted that Illinois reimbursed remote sellers subject to the statute for their use tax collection 
duties by providing a discount of two percent or $5, whichever larger, each calendar year, which 
meant that Bellas Hess would be compensated for the administrative costs of collecting the tax 
and remitting it to the state.50 
 
Important Cases Decided Between Bellas Hess and Quill 
 
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided two cases that further analyzed state taxation under 
the dormant Commerce Clause, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady51 and National Geographic 
Society v. California Board of Equalization.52 Neither of these cases dealt specifically with 
sellers that had no physical presence within the taxing state, but they developed the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in related ways.  
 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady 
 
At the time Bellas Hess was decided, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
included a formalistic blanket prohibition on any state taxation imposed directly on interstate 
transactions, which was established in Freeman v. Hewit,53 and the Spector rule, developed in 
Spector Motor Service v. O’Connor54 in reliance on Freeman and Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone.55 
The Spector rule stood for the proposition that a state’s taxation of purely interstate commerce on 
the “privilege of doing business” in the state was unconstitutional.56 In Complete Auto, the Court 
reconsidered both of these rules. 
The Complete Auto Court determined that, notwithstanding the apparent adoption of 
absolute immunity for interstate commerce from state taxation in Freeman, the Court had moved 
                                                             
46 Justice Fortas defined sufficient nexus as “ ‘Some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and 
the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’ ” Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 765 (Fortas, J., dissenting), quoting 
Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344, 74 S.Ct. 535, 539, 98 L.Ed. 744 (1954). 
47 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761-62 (dissent, J. Fortas) (“There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, 
continuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient ‘nexus’ to require Bellas Hess 
to collect from Illinois customers and to remit the use tax, especially when coupled with the use of the credit 
resources of residents of Illinois, dependent as that mechanism is upon the State’s banking and credit institutions.” 
48 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 763. 
49 Id., 386 U.S. at 766. 
50 Id., 386 U.S. at 764, n. 7 (Fortas, J., dissenting), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. chap. 2, §439.9 (1965). 
51 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). 
52 430 U.S. 551, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977). 
53 329 U.S. 249, 67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1946). The Bellas Hess Court cited Freeman for the proposition that 
the taxation of interstate commerce by a state can be justified only if designed to make that commerce “ ‘bear a fair 
share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys.’ ” Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756, quoting 
Freeman, 329 U.S. at 253. 
54 340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508, 95 L.Ed. 2d 573 (1951). 
55 335 U.S. 80, 68 S.Ct. 1475, 92 L.Ed.2d 1832 (1948). 
56 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 284. 
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towards permissibility of state taxation based on actual effect rather than formalistic 
requirements.57 In support, the Court described its decision in Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle,58 
in which it found that merely doing business in interstate commerce does not exempt 
corporations from state taxation, and foreign corporations conducting exclusively interstate 
business can be subject to state tax when the tax relates to the corporation’s local activities and 
benefits and protections that have been provided by the state to the corporation for which the 
state is justified in seeking a fair and reasonable return.59 The Court also rejected the Spector rule 
as unduly formalistic and instead adopted a four-prong test for Commerce Clause challenges to 
state taxation of interstate commerce.60  
The appellant in that case, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. (“Complete Auto”) was engaged 
in the business of transporting cars by truck to Mississippi dealers.61 The Mississippi State Tax 
Commission assessed Complete Auto a tax on the “privilege of doing business” within the state 
equal to five percent of the gross income of that business to be collected by adding it to the gross 
sales price for collection at the time the sales price is collected.62 The company argued that, 
under the Spector rule, the application of the tax on the privilege of doing business was 
unconstitutional because its activities in the state were purely interstate commerce.63  
The Court rejected that argument and determined that the Spector rule created a situation 
in which “magic words or labels” in a tax statute, specifically that statute imposed the tax on the 
“privilege of doing business,” could result in an otherwise constitutional tax being rejected under 
the dormant Commerce Clause.64 It stated that the Spector rule operated only as a drafting rule, 
which distracted courts and parties from inquiring into whether the tax placed an undue burden 
on interstate commerce.65 The Court determined that the rule demonstrated an underlying 
philosophy that interstate commerce had free trade immunity from state taxation.66 The Court 
rejected the formalism of the Spector rule and overturned the cases that resulted in this rule.67 
To replace the Spector rule, the Court established a four-prong test to determine whether 
state taxation of interstate commerce met the requirements of the Commerce Clause.68 If the tax: 
(1) was applied to an activity that had a substantial nexus with the state; (2) was fairly 
apportioned; (3) did not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) was fairly related to 
the services provided by the state, the tax was constitutional.69 This four-prong test continues to 
be applied in current dormant Commerce Clause cases involving state taxation. 
                                                             
57 Id., 430 U.S. at 281. This finding mirrored Justice Fortas’ argument in his Bellas Hess dissent that formalism 
should give way to a “realistic approach.” Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
58 421 U.S. 100, 108, 95 S.Ct. 1538, 1543, 44 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). 
59 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 287-288, quoting Colonial Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 108. See also Goldberg v. Sweet Gte 
Sprint Communications Corporation v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259, 109 S.Ct. 582, 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989) (Complete 
Auto specifically rejected “the view that the States cannot tax interstate commerce, while at the same time placing 
limits on state taxation of interstate commerce.”) 
60 Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. 
61 Id., 430 U.S. at 276. 
62 Id., 430 U.S. at 275-76. 
63 Id., 430 U.S. at 277-78. 
64 Id., 430 U.S. at 284, quoting Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 79 S.Ct. 411, 3 L.Ed. 2d 450 
(1959). 
65 Id., 430 U.S. at 285. 
66 Id., 430 U.S. at 278. 
67 Id., 430 U.S. at 288-89. 
68 Id., 430 U.S. at 279. 
69 Id. 
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National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization 
 
In National Geographic, the Court held that the Due Process Clause and the Commerce 
Clause were not violated when California imposed a requirement on the National Geographic 
Society, which sold maps, books, and other items to California residents by mail order, to collect 
and remit use taxes.70 National Geographic had two offices and employees in California that 
solicited advertising for its magazine, but were not involved in any activities related to the mail 
order sales.71 The Court held that the presence of these offices and personnel provided a 
sufficient nexus for the state to collect and remit use taxes even on sales to which the offices 
were not connected.72 The Court distinguished Bellas Hess because there the seller had no 
physical presence of any kind in Illinois, unlike National Geographic in California.73  
The National Geographic case clarified the Bellas Hess ruling by showing that any physical 
presence, whether related to the activities of the seller that were subject to state tax or not, was 
sufficient to bring that seller within the state’s taxing jurisdiction.  
The First Direct Challenge to the Physical Presence Rule 
 
Quill Corporation v. North Dakota by and through Heitkamp 
 
In 1992, 25 years after Bellas Hess and 15 years after Complete Auto and National 
Geographic, the Supreme Court revisited the physical presence rule. On facts virtually identical 
to Bellas Hess, the Court considered whether an out-of-state mail-order house with no in-state 
property, employees, or agents, that is, no physical presence, was subject to state law imposing a 
use tax on goods purchased state residents in Quill Corporation v. North Dakota by and through 
Heitkamp.74 
Quill was a Delaware corporation that sold office equipment and supplies and had offices 
and warehouses in Illinois, California, and Georgia.75 It had no physical presence in North 
Dakota, where it solicited sales through catalogues and flyers, advertisements in national 
magazines, and telephone calls.76 It was the sixth largest office supply vendor in North Dakota, 
with almost $1 million in sales and 3,000 customers in North Dakota, and delivered all of the 
items sold to North Dakota residents by mail and common carrier.77  
North Dakota attempted to impose a duty to collect and remit a use tax on Quill under a 
state statute that required every “retailer” maintaining a place of business in the state to collect 
and remit the tax.78 “Retailer” was defined in the North Dakota statute as “every person who 
                                                             
70 National Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556. 
71 Id., 430 U.S. at 552. 
72 Id., 430 U.S. at 556, 561 (“Here the Society’s two offices, without regard to the nature of their activities, had the 
advantage of the same municipal services, fire and police protection, and the like as they would have had if their 
activities … included assistance to the mail-order operations that generated the use taxes.”). 
73 Id., 430 U.S. at 560. 
74 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed. 2d 91 (1992). 
75 Quill, 504 U.S. at 302. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id., quoting N.D.Cent. Code §57-40.2-07 (Supp. 1991). 
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engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”79 “[R]egular or 
systematic solicitation” was defined as three or more advertisements in a 12-month period.80 
North Dakota, by its tax commissioner, filed an action to compel Quill to pay taxes, 
interest, and penalties on sales to state residents made after July 1, 1987.81 The trial court ruled in 
Quill’s favor, citing Bellas Hess in finding that the state did not show that it spent its revenues 
for the benefit of Quill’s sales in North Dakota; thus, there was no nexus with the state.82 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held that the huge changes 
in social, commercial, economic, and “legal innovations” since 1967, particularly technical 
changes and increases in the volume of mail order business, made Bellas Hess obsolete.83 The 
“legal innovations” mentioned by the court included the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause analyses in Complete Auto84 and National Geographic.85  
The North Dakota Supreme Court also asserted that Supreme Court cases following 
Bellas Hess did not require physical presence for the minimum contacts test for due process.86 It 
argued that instead the Court has considered whether the out-of-state retailer has purposefully 
directed its activities at a state’s residents in determining whether the retailer has minimum 
contacts with the state.87 The court determined that Quill’s lack of physical presence in the state 
was not fatal to the state’s attempt to impose a requirement to collect and remit use taxes on 
Quill.88 The court ruled that the use tax as applied to Quill satisfied the four-prong test in 
Complete Auto and did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause.89 
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, finding that the dormant Commerce Clause analysis in Bellas Hess was not obsolete.90 
First, though the Bellas Hess Court described the Due Process Clause test and the Commerce 
Clause test as “similar,” 91 the Quill Court distinguished them, finding they each developed 
distinct limits on the state taxing powers and differed in several fundamental ways.92 The Court 
determined that while a State may have the authority to tax a remote seller under the Due Process 
Clause, the tax may violate the Commerce Clause.93 
  
Overturning Bellas Hess’s Due Process Analysis 
 
 The Court asserted that in Bellas Hess, due process required a seller’s physical presence 
in a state before the state could impose a tax on that retailer.94 However, it found that the Court’s 
                                                             
79 Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-303, quoting N.D.Cent. Code §57-40.2-01(6) (Supp. 1991). 
80 Quill, 504 U.S. at 303, quoting N.D.Admin. Code §81-04.1-01-03.1 (1988). 
81 Quill, 504 U.S. at 303. 
82 Id.. 
83 State By and Through Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991). 
84 430 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 1076, 51 L.Ed.2d 326 (1977). 
85 430 U.S. 551, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977). 
86 Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 212, 213, quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-473, 105 S.Ct. 
2174, 2182, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 540-541 (1985). 
87 Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 212. 
88 Id., 470 N.W.2d at 215. 
89 Id., 470 N.W.2d at 219. 
90 Quill, 504 U.S. at 319. 
91 Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.  
92 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305. 
93 Id.. 
94 Id., 504 U.S. at 307. 
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jurisprudence on the Due Process Clause had evolved since 1967 based on the Court’s continual 
development of the standards of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.95 It determined that the 
relevant inquiry under the Due Process Clause is whether a defendant had minimum contacts 
with a state so that the suit against the defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.96 In a due process analysis, the Court no longer relied on formalistic tests 
that required a defendant's actual presence within the state.97 Instead, the proper analysis was 
more flexible and considered whether a remote seller’s contacts with the state made it reasonable 
to subject it to suit in the state’s courts.98 The Court found that this flexible analysis had been 
extended to all issues of state jurisdiction over out-of-state entities and individuals.99 Thus, on 
Quill’s due process arguments, the Court found that Quill had purposefully directed its business 
activities toward North Dakota residents, the magnitude of those contacts was sufficient for due 
process purposes, and the use tax was related to the benefits that Quill received from the state.100 
Thus, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not bar North Dakota’s imposition of the 
duty to collect and remit use tax on it and overturned Bellas Hess on this point.101 
 
 Sustaining Bellas Hess’s Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis 
 
 While striking down Bellas Hess’ analysis under the Due Process Clause, the Quill Court 
upheld Bellas Hess on the dormant Commerce Clause issue. It determined that the principles of 
stare decisis recommended a continuation of the physical presence rule.102 Many commentators 
believe that the doctrine of stare decisis was the central reason for the Court’s decision to retain 
the physical presence rule. (Swain I 2003; Swain II 2003; Rothfeld 1992; Hellerstein and 
Hellerstein 1998 and 2002; Pomp and McIntyre 1996) This is supported by the majority’s 
admission that modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not have required the same result 
if raised for the first time in Quill,103 and the concurrence, in which Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, argued that the matter should have been decided simply on the 
doctrine of stare decisis.104 
In upholding the physical presence rule, the Court cited Complete Auto’s four-part test to 
determine whether a state tax should be sustained under the Commerce Clause.105 The Court 
distinguished the minimum contacts test applied in the due process analysis from the substantial 
                                                             
95 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) 
96 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307, quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 
61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). 
97 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. 
98 Id., citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2584, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) ("all assertions of 
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its 
progeny.").  
99 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. 
100 Id., 504 U.S. at 308. 
101 Id. 
102 Id., 504 U.S. at 317. 
103 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. 
104 Id., 504 U.S. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, in judgment); see also Swain, supra, note 104, at 358 (“the 
three concurring justices seem to take us aside and whisper this sentiment” that the majority opinion was grounded 
in the doctrine of stare decisis.). 
105 See supra. See also Quill, 504 U.S. at 310-11, citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. (The four-part test required 
the Court to uphold a state’s right to tax if: (1) the activity taxed has a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) the 
tax is fairly apportioned; (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax is related 
fairly to the state services provided to the taxed entity.)  
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nexus requirement in the Complete Auto test, finding that a business can have minimum contacts 
with a taxing state required by the Due Process Clause, but lack the substantial nexus with the 
state required by the Commerce Clause.106 The Court also conflated the physical presence rule 
with the first prong of the Complete Auto test, asserting that the physical presence rule meant that 
a remote seller whose only contact with the taxing state was through mail or common carrier 
lacked the required substantial nexus.107 In other words, at least in the sales and use tax context, 
the first prong of the Complete Auto test, substantial nexus required physical presence.  
 While the Court admitted that it had abandoned formalistic Commerce Clause analysis in 
Complete Auto, it determined that the bright line rule requiring physical presence furthered the 
ends of the Commerce Clause and created a safe harbor for remote vendors whose only 
connection with the taxing state was by mail or common carrier.108 The Court admitted that the 
physical presence rule appeared “artificial at its edges,” but asserted that this artificiality was 
more than offset by the benefits of having a bright-line rule.109 It determined that the rule clearly 
established the limits on states’ right to tax out-of-state vendors, reduced litigation, and 
encouraged settled expectations and investment.110 It opined that the growth of mail-order 
businesses after Bellas Hess was due, at least in part, to the bright-line physical presence rule.111 
Finally, the majority placed the responsibility of changing the Bellas Hess rule, if deemed 
appropriate, in the hands of Congress.112 
 
 The Dissent 
 
 Justice White was the sole dissenter.113 He agreed with the majority in overturning the 
Due Process Clause portion of Bellas Hess, but believed that the Court should have overturned 
the entire case.114 Justice White argued that the majority’s finding that the due process minimum 
contacts test was different from the significant nexus prong of the Complete Auto test was 
completely novel and had never been found before by the Court.115 He asserted that the cases 
from which the Complete Auto substantial nexus requirement was derived demonstrate that it 
came from the due process fairness inquiry, not from a completely separate notion of nexus 
requiring a physical presence in the taxing state.116 
Justice White further argued that Complete Auto disavowed the interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause in Bellas Hess that prohibited states from taxing interstate commerce and 
cemented the proposition that states are not barred from taxing interstate commerce.117 In 
addition, the Court’s ruling in National Geographic decoupled the notion of a transactional 
                                                             
106 Id., 504 U.S. at 313. 
107 Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. 
108 Id., 504 U.S. at 314-15. 
109 Id., 504 U.S. at 315. 
110 Id., 504 U.S. at 315-16. 
111 Id., 504 U.S. at 316. 
112 Id., 504 U.S. at 318, quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637, 101 S.Ct. 2946, 2964, 
69 L.Ed. 2d 884 (1981). 
113 Quill, 504 U.S. at 321 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
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nexus from the Commerce Clause inquiry and repudiated Bellas Hess’s free trade rationale for 
remote sellers.118 
 Justice White argued that the current economy did not require a remote seller to maintain 
property or personnel in a state to do business there.119 He questioned what “physical presence” 
actually meant and whether Quill’s activities in North Dakota really showed that it had no 
physical presence.120 He predicted that determining the meaning of “physical presence” would 
result in an increase in litigation.121 Remote sellers like Quill still relied on the commercial 
benefits offered by the state in which they do business, including banking laws, the court system 
(for collections cases), waste disposal for the garbage created by mail order solicitations and 
packages, and consumer protection laws enacted for the protection of both consumer and 
vendor.122 Does this constitute physical presence sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes?  
He stated bluntly that the physical presence requirement was anachronistic in economic 
terms, illogical, and unfair.123 He disagreed with perpetuating a rule that created an interstate tax 
shelter for mail order businesses, which at that time was a $180 billion-a-year industry, but 
provided no advantage to their competitors.124 
 Justice White argued that retaining the physical presence rule on stare decisis grounds 
was not necessary and fears that states would impose retroactive tax liability absent the rule were 
groundless.125 He dismissed the value of industry reliance on the physical presence rule, 
particularly in light of the changing Commerce Clause analysis in recent cases.126 Quill’s 
reliance, in particular, he found unreasonable, especially in light of Quill’s refusal to pay the tax 
and then challenge it in court.127 
 Finally, Justice White argued that, while Congress should act in this area, the Court’s 
continued adherence to the Bellas Hess decision in light of recent cases and economic realities 
was not justified.128 
 
The Second Direct Challenge to the Physical Presence Rule 
 
 Since 1992 when the Quill Court upheld the physical presence rule, commentators have 
recommended that the Court revisit the issue and reject the rule. (Swain II 2003) In 2015, in his 
concurrence to Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, Justice Kennedy urged his colleagues and 
the legal system to find a case in which the Court could reconsider Quill and Bellas Hess because 
of the harm and unfairness caused to the states by their inability to collect revenue and changes 
in technology and consumer sophistication.129 Not long after, South Dakota appealed its state 
supreme court’s ruling in its suit against Wayfair, Inc. and others to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
asking the Court to invalidate the physical presence rule. 
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122 Id., 504 U.S. at 328. 
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South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. 
 
 Wayfair130 was decided on June 21, 2018, 26 years after Quill and 51 years after Bellas 
Hess. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the physical presence rule and overruled 
Quill and Bellas Hess. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices 
Thomas, Ginsberg, Alito, and Gorsuch.131  
 In 2016, a short time after Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Direct Marketing, South 
Dakota enacted an Act in S. 106132 with the express goal of judicially challenging the physical 
presence rule and the state’s inability to tax remote sellers, which it had determined was causing 
a decrease in critical funding for state and local services.133 (Howsare 2017) The Act was dubbed 
a “kill-Quill law” by some commentators. (Howsare 2017) South Dakota also declared an 
emergency based on the revenue lost from its inability to tax remote sellers, which it argued was 
necessary to support the state government and public institutions.134  
In response to the concerns raised in Bellas Hess and Quill that subjecting remote sellers 
to sales and use taxes could result in an undue administrative burden,135 the Act was specifically 
limited in its application to remote sellers that delivered more than $100,000 of goods or services 
in state each year or engaged in 200 or more in-state transactions.136 In addition, South Dakota is 
a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement developed by a number of states in 
2000 to simplify and modernize sales and use tax administration to substantially reduce the 
burden of sales and use tax compliance, including by simplifying the payment of both state and 
local taxes.137 This membership would provide remote sellers with resources to simplify the 
payment of state and local taxes.138 The Act also provided for a stay of its effect until 
constitutional issues could be determined and prevented retroactive application, another attempt 
to quell the Court’s concerns.139  
 South Dakota filed a declaratory judgment action against respondents Wayfair, Inc., 
Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc., all remote sellers with substantial sales and transactions 
in the state, arguing that these sellers should be required to collect sales tax from their in-state 
sales under the Act.140 Both the trial court and state supreme court granted summary judgment to 
respondents, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.141 
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 The Court determined that Quill was flawed.142 The Court set forth the history of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, particularly as related to state taxation of interstate commerce, in a 
sweeping analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence in the area since the U.S. Constitution was 
enacted.143 It detailed the criticism leveled against the physical presence rule.144 It found that the 
reasons the Quill Court gave for rejecting the application of the physical presence rule to the 
minimum contacts test of the Due Process Clause equally applied to rejecting it for the 
substantial nexus test in the Commerce Clause.145  
The Court scorned the finding in Quill that the complexities of complying with multiple 
state and local taxes might unduly burden sellers with no physical presence in a state, particularly 
as out-of-state sellers with a physical presence in a state were required to shoulder that burden.146 
The physical presence rule was a poor means to address compliance costs faced by remote sellers 
that do business in multiple states, and other aspects of Commerce Clause doctrine could deal 
with any potential burdens on interstate commerce better and more accurately than the physical 
presence rule.147 
 The Court also found that the physical presence rule interfered with states’ lawful 
authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions.148 In addition, the physical 
presence rule put sellers with a physical presence in a state at a competitive disadvantage and 
resulted in a judicially created tax shelter for remote sellers.149 It found that the rule produced 
distorted business decision-making by creating an incentive for remote sellers to avoid physical 
presence in a state.150 It determined that the rule undermined public confidence in the tax system 
and was unfair and unjust to states, competitors of remote sellers that had a physical presence, 
and customers who paid sales tax in the state.151 
 The Court also determined that the Quill Court ignored the rejection of formalism in the 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the embrace of a more functional analysis of 
market dynamics.152 Quill was wrongly decided even with regard to the less complex economic 
realities in 1992.153 The Court also dismissed as unsound the argument that the physical presence 
rule is easy to apply, finding that the prevalence of e-commerce made determining what 
constitutes physical presence more and more difficult.154 In light of modern day e-commerce the 
definition of physical presence was unclear, particularly given the virtual presence that online 
marketers have in customers’ computers and smart phones through apps and cookies and in data 
storage facilities located in-state.155 The Court predicted that, given present day economic 
realities, if left to continue, the physical presence rule would result in increasing litigation on the 
meaning of “physical presence.”156 
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 The Court dismissed the idea that the doctrine of stare decisis required it to uphold Quill, 
finding that stare decisis could not support the physical presence rule because the rule 
unconstitutionally infringed on states’ sovereign powers.157 While the Court found that reliance 
interests could be legitimate considerations in deciding whether to uphold Court precedent, the 
arguments for reliance based on the physical presence rule were not.158  
The Court conceded that Congress had the authority to reject or alter the physical 
presence rule; however, Congress did not have the authority to change a constitutional default 
rule established by the Court.159 Further, given that the “false constitutional premise” of the 
physical presence rule was judicially created and through it the Court was limiting the lawful 
authority of the states, the Court could not rely on Congress to change the law but must reject the 
rule itself.160 Indeed, while Congress had introduced legislation in 2018 to overturn the physical 
presence rule and at other times during the five decades it was in effect, it did not pass it.161 
(Swain II 2003) 
 The Court discounted the difficulties that small businesses and start-ups may have with 
complying with state and local taxes.162 It determined that software and other systems have been 
and will continue to be developed to help businesses comply.163 Further, the South Dakota Act, 
by its terms, applied only to remote sellers doing a large amount of business in South Dakota.164 
In addition, the Court found that in the absence of the physical presence rule, the dormant 
Commerce Clause and the four-pronged Complete Auto test would continue to protect businesses 
from any actual undue burden on interstate commerce.165 
 After overruling Quill and Bellas Hess and invalidating the physical presence rule, the 
Court determined that there was a substantial nexus between the activities of the respondents and 
South Dakota; therefore, the Act passed the substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test.166 
With regard to the remaining three prongs of that test, which the parties had not litigated or 
briefed, the Court determined that it need not resolve them.167 On that basis, the Court vacated 
the decision of the state supreme court and remanded the case for further proceedings.168 
However, it also listed features of the South Dakota Act that appeared to be designed to prevent 
undue burdens or discrimination on interstate commerce: (1) the Act provides a safe harbor for 
businesses with limited or intermittent sales in the state; (2) the language of Act prevented 
retroactive application; and (3) South Dakota is a member of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement.169  
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The Concurrences 
 
 Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch separately concurred.170 Justice Thomas reflected 
that he should have joined Justice White’s dissent in Quill.171 He asserted that the whole of the 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence could not be justified rationally.172 Justice Gorsuch 
also quoted Justice White’s dissent with approval, opining that the physical presence rule created 
a discriminatory tax shelter for remote sellers.173 He also hinted that he disagreed with aspects of 
the dormant Commerce Clause, but left that as “questions for another day.”174 
 
 The Dissent 
 
 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented from 
the majority opinion.175 Justice Roberts agreed with the majority that Bellas Hess was wrongly 
decided176; however, he argued that rejecting the physical presence rule could disrupt the 
economy.177 He asserted that the doctrine of stare decisis is heightened in dormant Commerce 
Clause cases because Congress has the power to decide the underlying issue.178 He noted that 
three bills on this issue were pending in Congress and opined that Congress could better resolve 
the situation than the Court.179 He cited to information that states are already able to collect 80 
percent of the tax revenue that would be available without the physical presence rule,180 and 
argued that rejecting the physical presence rule would impose costs on remote sellers, with the 
burden falling mainly on small businesses.181 
 
The Potential Consequences of Wayfair 
 
The potential consequences of the Wayfair decision are speculative, though some are 
highly probable. First, rather than settle the law in this area, Wayfair will likely lead to increased 
litigation as more states impose duties to collect sales and use taxes on remote sellers. Some 
states may try to expand the substantial nexus requirement from the limits in the South Dakota 
law to increase tax revenues. Remote sellers eager to limit substantial nexus will file numerous 
lawsuits to test states’ unique sales and use tax laws. As the Supreme Court is unlikely to further 
clarify the limits of substantial nexus anytime soon, the minimum requirements are likely to be 
the subject of years of litigation in the lower courts before the issue is settled.  
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Second, Congress may choose to address the issue through legislation, despite its past 
failure to do so even in the face of encouragement by the Supreme Court.182 As noted by Chief 
Justice Roberts in his Wayfair dissent, three bills were pending in Congress on this issue at the 
time of the decision.183 However, instead of sidelining this issue in Congress, as he feared, 
Wayfair may push remote sellers to lobby for legislation preventing states from imposing these 
taxes on them and may push states to seek Congressional guidance on the limits of such taxation. 
Decisive congressional action could prevent much of the anticipated litigation on the limits of the 
substantial nexus requirement; of course, there is no guarantee that Congress will act. 
Third, many states may simply copy South Dakota’s statute to avoid litigation. Wayfair 
provides three safe harbors to assist states in meeting the substantial nexus requirement and 
provide remote sellers with “a reasonable degree of protection.”184 First, the Wayfair majority 
cited with approval the limitations on the applicability of the South Dakota law, gross revenue of 
over $100,000 and 200 or more separate transactions.185 Second, the South Dakota law expressly 
prohibits retroactive application.186 Third, the Court cited South Dakota’s membership in the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“Agreement”) with approval.187 Lower courts are 
likely to find that state statutes that include the same or higher limits and prohibit retroactive 
application in states that are members of the Agreement meet the requirements for substantial 
nexus, fulfilling the first prong of the Complete Auto test.  
It is less likely that there will be significant litigation brought under the remaining three 
prongs of the Complete Auto test – whether the tax is fairly apportioned, whether it discriminates 
against interstate commerce, and whether it is fairly related to services provided by the state. 
Numerous cases applying Complete Auto to other types of state taxes have established settled 
rules to help states navigate these waters.  
To comply with the fair apportionment requirement,188 the state tax must be both 
internally consistent189 and externally consistent.190 If the law requires the remote seller to collect 
only the sales or use taxes imposed on sales made to residents within its borders, the tax is likely 
to be considered fairly apportioned. Internal consistency would exist because, if other states 
imposed identical sales taxes only on sales made within their borders, there would be no double 
taxation. External consistency would also exist because the state would tax only sales made by 
the remote seller to state residents.  
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To prevent discrimination of interstate commerce, the state must avoid making 
distinctions in applying the law to in-state and remote sellers. If an identical tax burden is placed 
on both remote and in-state sellers – the same amount of tax, the same collection duties, the same 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements, etc. – the courts will likely find that the tax does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce.191  
To be reasonably related to services provided by the state, the measure of the tax must be 
in proportion to the taxpayer’s activities in the state, such as a percentage of the monetary 
amount of sales made to state residents by the taxpayer.192 
If a state’s law remains within the safe harbors in Wayfair for the substantial nexus prong 
and complies with the three additional requirements in Complete Auto, it is highly unlikely that 
the law will be found to discriminate against interstate commerce. 
Finally, following Wayfair, state sales and use tax statutes may become more uniform 
and collection less onerous. The Agreement is intended to help states simplify and streamline 
sales and use tax administration and reduce the burden of compliance.193 It provides free 
assistance of certified service providers and free software to help sellers comply with sales and 
use tax laws and assist in audits, and sellers who use those services are immune from many types 
of liability.194 Given the Court’s positive response to the Agreement, more states are likely to 
join, making uniformity and ease of collection more likely. 
Conclusion 
 
 Over the past 51 years, the Supreme Court’s development of dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence for the application of states’ sales and use taxes to remote sellers has been blind to 
the dramatic changes to the economy during that period. When the Supreme Court decided 
Bellas Hess in 1967, based on the formalistic jurisprudence of the day, states’ authority to 
impose state sales and use taxes on sales made by sellers in interstate commerce was flatly and 
completely denied through the physical presence rule. Further, at that time sales by remote 
sellers were not a large part of the economy, meaning that states’ revenues were only minimally 
impacted by the rule. However, by 1977, the Court recognized in Complete Auto that a more 
realistic interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause relating to state taxation was necessary, 
and formalistic analyses was rejected. The Quill Court skirted this change in the law and upheld 
the formalistic flat denial imposed by the physical presence rule on stare decisis and other 
grounds, notwithstanding the major changes in the mail order industry that had been made by 
that time. Finally, in Wayfair, the Supreme Court struck down the physical presence rule, 
restoring equity to the application of sales and use taxes and recognizing states’ sovereignty and 
                                                             
191 Armco Inc v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984) (the third Complete Auto test 
prong that requires that a state tax may not discriminate against interstate commerce means that “a State may not tax 
a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.”) 
192 Commonwealth Edison Company, 453 U.S. at 626-27 (“the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test 
imposes the additional limitation that the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of the contact, 
since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear a just share of 
state tax burden. … When a tax is assessed in proportion to a taxpayer's activities or presence in a State, the taxpayer 
is shouldering its fair share of supporting the State's provision of police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained 
work force, and the advantages of a civilized society.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
193 See Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board website, “What is the purpose of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement?” (https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=gen3). 
194 Id., “What are the benefits of using a Certified Service Provider?” 
(https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=csps3). 
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authority to tax commerce carried on within their boundaries. This decision will provide states 
with the means to increase their sales and use tax revenues from remote sellers within the 
reasonable boundaries of the dormant Commerce Clause, but will likely result in increased 
litigation as states and remote sellers test the boundaries of substantial nexus. In addition, 
Congress will be under increased pressure from interest groups to clarify states’ ability to impose 
sales and use tax collection duties on remote sellers. Finally, more states are likely to join the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement based on the Court’s tacit approval, which may result 
in greater uniformity in states’ laws and reduced burdens of compliance by remote sellers.  
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